80% is Hype? Six Major Red Flags to See Stable's True Intent

By: blockbeats|2025/11/17 12:00:03
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Editor's Note: Recently, Stable completed two significant rounds of presale events in a short period of time. The initial allocation of 8.25 billion USD was quickly sold out, and the second round saw qualified subscriptions surpassing 11 billion USD, attracting high industry attention.

However, behind the impressive data, there are also backgrounds that need to be clarified. The project is driven by key figures from Tether, with USDT as the native asset forming a strong peg. The presale allocation is highly concentrated among early institutions and insiders. Moreover, from the enactment of the "GENIUS Act" to the accelerated project development, the timing between the two is overly tight.

This article attempts to present a more complete picture beyond the hype, addressing what infrastructure problems it is solving, who benefited in the early stages, where the risks lie, and why this issuance is worth careful scrutiny beyond the surface.

The following is the translation of the original text.

TL;DR: Overview


Stable project swept the field with a TVL of 8.25 billion USD in the first phase, completing the raise in just 20 minutes, and has recently launched the public testnet. However, behind this frenzy, there are some uncomfortable issues: risks brought by the high concentration of stablecoins, insider positioning in advance, and whether this project is actually solving payment issues or just creating a new batch of "bagholders." Below is an attempt at an honest interpretation:

What is the project?

A Layer 1 based on USDT as the native asset, backed by Tether insiders—but who is really benefiting?

Key Data:

Raised 28 million USD in seed funding, presale size of 8.25 billion USD (snatched up in 20 minutes—was it too fast?); the public testnet is live, but the mainnet is still weeks away from launch, and early insiders are already preparing to exit.

Core Narrative:

Stablecoins need a new payment rail, but the current design of Stable is more favorable to those who got in early, putting retail investors at a clear "disadvantageous" position.

80% is Hype? Six Major Red Flags to See Stable's True Intent

Value Proposition: 7/10

What problem is it actually solving:

Using USDT as gas does eliminate the hassle of dealing with two different tokens, which is a valid point. But there is a blunt question: Do users really care about this, or are they mainly chasing after the high yields of yield farming?

Honest Assessment:

It does indeed address a real issue (gas fees for stablecoin transfers), but on Solana / Polygon, a single $100,000 transfer has long been achievable for less than $1 in fees. Tether's USDT0 cross-chain mechanism can achieve a similar effect without needing to create a new L1 chain. The so-called "pain point" may not be as significant as marketing makes it out to be

Truly Valuable Aspect:

It seems more like a payment infrastructure for institutions rather than a retail-side payment innovation.

But the current structure is: Retail investors handle speculation, while institutions take away the value at the protocol layer.

Six Key Red Flags

Red Flag 1: Solving for the Sake of Solving; the Problem Isn't That Painful

USDT transfers are already very cheap, with fees generally less than $1 on @Solana. So why specifically launch a brand-new L1 chain just to further reduce fees by 10–20%?

Competitive Landscape: 6/10

Real Competitive Environment:

@Plasma ($XPL): Similar narrative, smaller funding scale, but with a different tokenomics design

@Solana + $USDT: USDT daily trading volume has already reached the $5 billion level, with low friction usage

@LayerZero_Core / $USDT0: Transferring USDT can be accomplished through existing cross-chain infrastructure, avoiding the need for a new chain

Why Stable isn't Indestructible:

First-mover advantage does exist, but can be replicated within 6 months

If alternative solutions are equally usable, sustained network effects are challenging to accumulate

Validator high centralization (only about thirty major validators) implies significant centralization risk

Red Flag 2: Suspicious Timing

《GENIUS Act》 passed (June 2025)

→ @Tether_to suddenly accelerates new L1 in August 2025

→ Pre-sale oversubscribed by 39x in October 2025

This series of timing events looks like a pre-planned coordinated move.

Growth and Hype: 7/10

$8.25 Billion Pre-sale: Taking a Reality Check

Sold out in 20 minutes (more like FOMO than organic demand), with a high probability of 95% of funds coming from whales and insiders with advance knowledge, leaving almost no FOMO stage for retail investors due to the rapid fill-up. Funds are locked until mainnet launch, preventing early exits.

What these phenomena actually indicate:

Institutional interest is indeed present, but funds and chips are highly concentrated. Early insiders are likely to sell at mainnet launch, with retail investors likely entering at the peak of excitement.

Public Testnet Activity (Average):

Discord subscribers 600+ (not impressive for a project focusing on a new L1), developer activity remains to be observed (only two weeks since testnet launch). Real applications will not be rolled out until after mainnet launch, with no actual on-chain transaction volume data to refer to.

Red Flag 3: Pre-sale Structure Design

Funds are locked in a vault until mainnet launch, only unlocking upon open claim.

This is a classic 'Unlock-Dump' structure:

Early depositors naturally become the most motivated sellers when they can claim.

Narrative and Story: 7/10

Why the Story Sounds Compelling:

A clear regulatory framework (《GENIUS Act》) creates a sense of urgency that "if you don't get in now, you'll miss out"

Endorsed by @Tether_to, it looks like receiving official institutional approval at a higher level

There is indeed a gap in payment infrastructure objectively

From a chronological perspective, everything seems to have naturally fallen into place

The loophole in this narrative:

"USDT as gas" is not a disruptive innovation but rather an incremental improvement. The adoption of stablecoins itself does not rely on creating a new L1 chain; the real beneficiaries are insiders of the protocol rather than regular users.

The story told to retail investors remains the same: "Hold stablecoins and earn additional yield," which has already been a proven classic trap in the previous cycle

Red Flag 4: The regulatory story seems a bit too "over-the-top"

The "GENIUS Act" has just been passed, and immediately, a perfectly timed and unbeatable narrative USDT L1 emerges? Overall, it feels more like a transaction that was already structured waiting for regulatory approval, conveniently wrapped in a layer of compliance.

Supporter Score: 5/10

The Real Beneficiaries:

@paoloardoino (Tether CEO): If Stable becomes the mainstream payment rail, he is the most direct beneficiary

@bitfinex: As a liquidity provider, they can continue to earn money through transaction fees

Franklin Templeton: Strategic investors laying out on the emerging infrastructure

Early seed round investors: Stuck in a position before the mainnet launch, waiting to offload at the peak of mainnet hype

Potential Casualties:

Buyers of pre-deposit reserves, latecomers to the mainnet, and regular users who think this is a "free payment" solution (they will pay the price elsewhere)

Red Flag 5: Conflict of Interest

Tether's CEO is advocating for a infrastructure with $USDT as the native token—The more USDT is used, the more he earns.

Such a clear conflict of interest, yet it has not been emphasized as a "major conflict" publicly.

Red Flag 6: Insider Pre-positioning

A $28 million seed round, most likely receiving a substantial allocation. The presale itself is filled with insider funds

Moment of mainnet launch → Insiders almost guaranteed to be able to offload chips to retail FOMO

Market Timing: 6/10

Why launch now?

The "GENIUS Act" provides a compliance umbrella, with the market sentiment towards stablecoins overall being positive. But all of this, timing-wise, seems a bit too "perfect"

Potential Red Flags:

Regulatory backlash (opposition to the "GENIUS Act" itself); Competing L1 stablecoins launching faster, stealing the narrative; Post mainnet launch, real trading volume falls short of expectations; Insider dumping causing a token price crash

A more candid explanation:

The pace of this issuance is: "We wait for regulatory clarity, then immediately rush into the market." This is either textbook-level execution, or a highly coordinated "carefully orchestrated" plan.

Conclusion

Final Score: 38/60 (63%)

Bull Case (Still Holding):

Global payment infrastructure is indeed very important; A network based on USDT as the native asset may well become an industry standard in the future; Pre-positioning in infrastructure can indeed capture long-term value; From the information disclosed so far, the mainnet's technical execution seems reasonably sound

Bear Case (Equally Valid):

Insiders have already heavily positioned themselves well before retail entry; The problem being solved has already been "mostly solved" by existing solutions; The tokenomics heavily favor early depositors but disadvantage latecomers buying on mainnet; If the "GENIUS Act" faces challenges, the project faces regulatory uncertainty

The Uncomfortable Truth:

This may indeed be a project that is "not bad" on the infrastructure front, but its distribution and issuance mechanism clearly heavily favor insiders: Early depositors are most incentivized to sell at the top of mainnet FOMO, while retail investors are usually left holding the bag when emotions are highest.

This is as classic a structure as it gets.


Conclusion:

Stable has a solid technical standpoint and indeed targets a real problem.

However, its choice of timing, pre-deposit mechanism, and internal positioning are all highly in line with that kind of—

“It looks like infrastructure upgrade but is essentially an early insider-friendly issuance” standard paradigm.

This doesn’t necessarily mean the project is bad,

it just means: the risk is extremely asymmetric.

Be sure to think about: which side of the timeline you are currently on.

This is not investment advice, but you can note one detail:

Institutional pre-deposits were filled in 20 minutes,

while on the retail side, people were still asking, “What is Stable?”.

The time difference between insiders and retail entry

is often where most losses occur.

Original Article Link

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China's Central Bank and Eight Other Departments' Latest Regulatory Focus: Key Attention to RWA Tokenized Asset Risk


Foreword: Today, the People's Bank of China's website published the "Notice of the People's Bank of China, National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, Ministry of Public Security, State Administration for Market Regulation, China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission, China Securities Regulatory Commission, State Administration of Foreign Exchange on Further Preventing and Dealing with Risks Related to Virtual Currency and Others (Yinfa [2026] No. 42)", the latest regulatory requirements from the eight departments including the central bank, which are basically consistent with the regulatory requirements of recent years. The main focus of the regulation is on speculative activities such as virtual currency trading, exchanges, ICOs, overseas platform services, and this time, regulatory oversight of RWA has been added, explicitly prohibiting RWA tokenization, stablecoins (especially those pegged to the RMB). The following is the full text:


To the people's governments of all provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities directly under the Central Government, the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps:


  Recently, there have been speculative activities related to virtual currency and Real-World Assets (RWA) tokenization, disrupting the economic and financial order and jeopardizing the property security of the people. In order to further prevent and address the risks related to virtual currency and Real-World Assets tokenization, effectively safeguard national security and social stability, in accordance with the "Law of the People's Republic of China on the People's Bank of China," "Law of the People's Republic of China on Commercial Banks," "Securities Law of the People's Republic of China," "Law of the People's Republic of China on Securities Investment Funds," "Law of the People's Republic of China on Futures and Derivatives," "Cybersecurity Law of the People's Republic of China," "Regulations of the People's Republic of China on the Administration of Renminbi," "Regulations on Prevention and Disposal of Illegal Fundraising," "Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Foreign Exchange Administration," "Telecommunications Regulations of the People's Republic of China," and other provisions, after reaching consensus with the Cyberspace Administration of China, the Supreme People's Court, and the Supreme People's Procuratorate, and with the approval of the State Council, the relevant matters are notified as follows:


  I. Clarify the essential attributes of virtual currency, Real-World Assets tokenization, and related business activities


  (I) Virtual currency does not possess the legal status equivalent to fiat currency. Virtual currencies such as Bitcoin, Ether, Tether, etc., have the main characteristics of being issued by non-monetary authorities, using encryption technology and distributed ledger or similar technology, existing in digital form, etc. They do not have legal tender status, should not and cannot be circulated and used as currency in the market.


  The business activities related to virtual currency are classified as illegal financial activities. The exchange of fiat currency and virtual currency within the territory, exchange of virtual currencies, acting as a central counterparty in buying and selling virtual currencies, providing information intermediary and pricing services for virtual currency transactions, token issuance financing, and trading of virtual currency-related financial products, etc., fall under illegal financial activities, such as suspected illegal issuance of token vouchers, unauthorized public issuance of securities, illegal operation of securities and futures business, illegal fundraising, etc., are strictly prohibited across the board and resolutely banned in accordance with the law. Overseas entities and individuals are not allowed to provide virtual currency-related services to domestic entities in any form.


  A stablecoin pegged to a fiat currency indirectly fulfills some functions of the fiat currency in circulation. Without the consent of relevant authorities in accordance with the law and regulations, any domestic or foreign entity or individual is not allowed to issue a RMB-pegged stablecoin overseas.


(II)Tokenization of Real-World Assets refers to the use of encryption technology and distributed ledger or similar technologies to transform ownership rights, income rights, etc., of assets into tokens (tokens) or other interests or bond certificates with token (token) characteristics, and carry out issuance and trading activities.


  Engaging in the tokenization of real-world assets domestically, as well as providing related intermediary, information technology services, etc., which are suspected of illegal issuance of token vouchers, unauthorized public offering of securities, illegal operation of securities and futures business, illegal fundraising, and other illegal financial activities, shall be prohibited; except for relevant business activities carried out with the approval of the competent authorities in accordance with the law and regulations and relying on specific financial infrastructures. Overseas entities and individuals are not allowed to illegally provide services related to the tokenization of real-world assets to domestic entities in any form.


  II. Sound Work Mechanism


  (III) Inter-agency Coordination. The People's Bank of China, together with the National Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, the Ministry of Public Security, the State Administration for Market Regulation, the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission, the China Securities Regulatory Commission, the State Administration of Foreign Exchange, and other departments, will improve the work mechanism, strengthen coordination with the Cyberspace Administration of China, the Supreme People's Court, and the Supreme People's Procuratorate, coordinate efforts, and overall guide regions to carry out risk prevention and disposal of virtual currency-related illegal financial activities.


  The China Securities Regulatory Commission, together with the National Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, the Ministry of Public Security, the People's Bank of China, the State Administration for Market Regulation, the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission, the State Administration of Foreign Exchange, and other departments, will improve the work mechanism, strengthen coordination with the Cyberspace Administration of China, the Supreme People's Court, and the Supreme People's Procuratorate, coordinate efforts, and overall guide regions to carry out risk prevention and disposal of illegal financial activities related to the tokenization of real-world assets.


  (IV) Strengthening Local Implementation. The people's governments at the provincial level are overall responsible for the prevention and disposal of risks related to virtual currencies and the tokenization of real-world assets in their respective administrative regions. The specific leading department is the local financial regulatory department, with participation from branches and dispatched institutions of the State Council's financial regulatory department, telecommunications regulators, public security, market supervision, and other departments, in coordination with cyberspace departments, courts, and procuratorates, to improve the normalization of the work mechanism, effectively connect with the relevant work mechanisms of central departments, form a cooperative and coordinated working pattern between central and local governments, effectively prevent and properly handle risks related to virtual currencies and the tokenization of real-world assets, and maintain economic and financial order and social stability.


  III. Strengthened Risk Monitoring, Prevention, and Disposal


  (5) Enhanced Risk Monitoring. The People's Bank of China, China Securities Regulatory Commission, National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, Ministry of Public Security, State Administration of Foreign Exchange, Cyberspace Administration of China, and other departments continue to improve monitoring techniques and system support, enhance cross-departmental data analysis and sharing, establish sound information sharing and cross-validation mechanisms, promptly grasp the risk situation of activities related to virtual currency and real-world asset tokenization. Local governments at all levels give full play to the role of local monitoring and early warning mechanisms. Local financial regulatory authorities, together with branches and agencies of the State Council's financial regulatory authorities, as well as departments of cyberspace and public security, ensure effective connection between online monitoring, offline investigation, and fund tracking, efficiently and accurately identify activities related to virtual currency and real-world asset tokenization, promptly share risk information, improve early warning information dissemination, verification, and rapid response mechanisms.


  (6) Strengthened Oversight of Financial Institutions, Intermediaries, and Technology Service Providers. Financial institutions (including non-bank payment institutions) are prohibited from providing account opening, fund transfer, and clearing services for virtual currency-related business activities, issuing and selling financial products related to virtual currency, including virtual currency and related financial products in the scope of collateral, conducting insurance business related to virtual currency, or including virtual currency in the scope of insurance liability. Financial institutions (including non-bank payment institutions) are prohibited from providing custody, clearing, and settlement services for unauthorized real-world asset tokenization-related business and related financial products. Relevant intermediary institutions and information technology service providers are prohibited from providing intermediary, technical, or other services for unauthorized real-world asset tokenization-related businesses and related financial products.


  (7) Enhanced Management of Internet Information Content and Access. Internet enterprises are prohibited from providing online business venues, commercial displays, marketing, advertising, or paid traffic diversion services for virtual currency and real-world asset tokenization-related business activities. Upon discovering clues of illegal activities, they should promptly report to relevant departments and provide technical support and assistance for related investigations and inquiries. Based on the clues transferred by the financial regulatory authorities, the cyberspace administration, telecommunications authorities, and public security departments should promptly close and deal with websites, mobile applications (including mini-programs), and public accounts engaged in virtual currency and real-world asset tokenization-related business activities in accordance with the law.


  (8) Strengthened Entity Registration and Advertisement Management. Market supervision departments strengthen entity registration and management, and enterprise and individual business registrations must not contain terms such as "virtual currency," "virtual asset," "cryptocurrency," "crypto asset," "stablecoin," "real-world asset tokenization," or "RWA" in their names or business scopes. Market supervision departments, together with financial regulatory authorities, legally enhance the supervision of advertisements related to virtual currency and real-world asset tokenization, promptly investigating and handling relevant illegal advertisements.


  (IX) Continued Rectification of Virtual Currency Mining Activities. The National Development and Reform Commission, together with relevant departments, strictly controls virtual currency mining activities, continuously promotes the rectification of virtual currency mining activities. The people's governments of various provinces take overall responsibility for the rectification of "mining" within their respective administrative regions. In accordance with the requirements of the National Development and Reform Commission and other departments in the "Notice on the Rectification of Virtual Currency Mining Activities" (NDRC Energy-saving Building [2021] No. 1283) and the provisions of the "Guidance Catalog for Industrial Structure Adjustment (2024 Edition)," a comprehensive review, investigation, and closure of existing virtual currency mining projects are conducted, new mining projects are strictly prohibited, and mining machine production enterprises are strictly prohibited from providing mining machine sales and other services within the country.


  (X) Severe Crackdown on Related Illegal Financial Activities. Upon discovering clues to illegal financial activities related to virtual currency and the tokenization of real-world assets, local financial regulatory authorities, branches of the State Council's financial regulatory authorities, and other relevant departments promptly investigate, determine, and properly handle the issues in accordance with the law, and seriously hold the relevant entities and individuals legally responsible. Those suspected of crimes are transferred to the judicial authorities for processing according to the law.


 (XI) Severe Crackdown on Related Illegal and Criminal Activities. The Ministry of Public Security, the People's Bank of China, the State Administration for Market Regulation, the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission, the China Securities Regulatory Commission, as well as judicial and procuratorial organs, in accordance with their respective responsibilities, rigorously crack down on illegal and criminal activities related to virtual currency, the tokenization of real-world assets, such as fraud, money laundering, illegal business operations, pyramid schemes, illegal fundraising, and other illegal and criminal activities carried out under the guise of virtual currency, the tokenization of real-world assets, etc.


  (XII) Strengthen Industry Self-discipline. Relevant industry associations should enhance membership management and policy advocacy, based on their own responsibilities, advocate and urge member units to resist illegal financial activities related to virtual currency and the tokenization of real-world assets. Member units that violate regulatory policies and industry self-discipline rules are to be disciplined in accordance with relevant self-regulatory management regulations. By leveraging various industry infrastructure, conduct risk monitoring related to virtual currency, the tokenization of real-world assets, and promptly transfer issue clues to relevant departments.


  IV. Strict Supervision of Domestic Entities Engaging in Overseas Business Activities


(XIII) Without the approval of relevant departments in accordance with the law and regulations, domestic entities and foreign entities controlled by them may not issue virtual currency overseas.


  (XIV) Domestic entities engaging directly or indirectly in overseas external debt-based tokenization of real-world assets, or conducting asset securitization activities abroad based on domestic ownership rights, income rights, etc. (hereinafter referred to as domestic equity), should be strictly regulated in accordance with the principles of "same business, same risk, same rules." The National Development and Reform Commission, the China Securities Regulatory Commission, the State Administration of Foreign Exchange, and other relevant departments regulate it according to their respective responsibilities. For other forms of overseas real-world asset tokenization activities based on domestic equity by domestic entities, the China Securities Regulatory Commission, together with relevant departments, supervise according to their division of responsibilities. Without the consent and filing of relevant departments, no unit or individual may engage in the above-mentioned business.


  (15) Overseas subsidiaries and branches of domestic financial institutions providing Real World Asset Tokenization-related services overseas shall do so legally and prudently. They shall have professional personnel and systems in place to effectively mitigate business risks, strictly implement customer onboarding, suitability management, anti-money laundering requirements, and incorporate them into the domestic financial institutions' compliance and risk management system. Intermediaries and information technology service providers offering Real World Asset Tokenization services abroad based on domestic equity or conducting Real World Asset Tokenization business in the form of overseas debt for domestic entities directly or indirectly venturing abroad must strictly comply with relevant laws and regulations. They should establish and improve relevant compliance and internal control systems in accordance with relevant normative requirements, strengthen business and risk control, and report the business developments to the relevant regulatory authorities for approval or filing.


  V. Strengthen Organizational Implementation


  (16) Strengthen organizational leadership and overall coordination. All departments and regions should attach great importance to the prevention of risks related to virtual currencies and Real World Asset Tokenization, strengthen organizational leadership, clarify work responsibilities, form a long-term effective working mechanism with centralized coordination, local implementation, and shared responsibilities, maintain high pressure, dynamically monitor risks, effectively prevent and mitigate risks in an orderly and efficient manner, legally protect the property security of the people, and make every effort to maintain economic and financial order and social stability.


  (17) Widely carry out publicity and education. All departments, regions, and industry associations should make full use of various media and other communication channels to disseminate information through legal and policy interpretation, analysis of typical cases, and education on investment risks, etc. They should promote the illegality and harm of virtual currencies and Real World Asset Tokenization-related businesses and their manifestations, fully alert to potential risks and hidden dangers, and enhance public awareness and identification capabilities for risk prevention.


  VI. Legal Responsibility


  (18) Engaging in illegal financial activities related to virtual currencies and Real World Asset Tokenization in violation of this notice, as well as providing services for virtual currencies and Real World Asset Tokenization-related businesses, shall be punished in accordance with relevant regulations. If it constitutes a crime, criminal liability shall be pursued according to the law. For domestic entities and individuals who knowingly or should have known that overseas entities illegally provided virtual currency or Real World Asset Tokenization-related services to domestic entities and still assisted them, relevant responsibilities shall be pursued according to the law. If it constitutes a crime, criminal liability shall be pursued according to the law.


  (19) If any unit or individual invests in virtual currencies, Real World Asset Tokens, and related financial products against public order and good customs, the relevant civil legal actions shall be invalid, and any resulting losses shall be borne by them. If there are suspicions of disrupting financial order and jeopardizing financial security, the relevant departments shall deal with them according to the law.


  This notice shall enter into force upon the date of its issuance. The People's Bank of China and ten other departments' "Notice on Further Preventing and Dealing with the Risks of Virtual Currency Trading Speculation" (Yinfa [2021] No. 237) is hereby repealed.


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