Macro Pulse: Why Big Drops Are More Brutal Than the Market Expects

By: blockbeats|2025/11/21 16:00:03
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Original Article Title: Why the endgame looks uglier than markets are pricing
Original Author: arndxt
Original Translation: SpecialistXBT

Over the past few months, my stance has undergone a substantial shift:

From "extreme bearishness turning into bullishness" (a form of crowded pessimism often setting the stage for a short squeeze) to "remaining bearish and genuinely concerned that the system is entering a more fragile phase."

This shift is not triggered by a single event but is based on the following five mutually reinforcing dynamics:

1. Policy error risk is on the rise. The Fed is tightening financial conditions due to economic data uncertainties and clear signs of economic slowdown.

2. The AI/Mega-Cap nexus is transitioning from a cash-rich to a leveraged growth model. This shifts risks from pure stock volatility to more classic credit cycle concerns.

3. Private credit and loan valuations are starting to decouple. Beneath the surface, early but worrying signs of model-driven pricing pressure have emerged.

4. The K-shaped economy is solidifying into a political issue. For an increasing swath of the population, the social contract is no longer credible; this sentiment will eventually find political expression.

5. Market concentration has become a systemic and political vulnerability. When around 40% of an index's weight is actually concentrated in a few highly geopolitically and leverage-sensitive tech monopolies, they are no longer just growth stories but national security issues and policy targets.

Macro Pulse: Why Big Drops Are More Brutal Than the Market Expects

The base case may still be that policymakers will ultimately "do what they always do": inject liquidity back into the system and support asset prices into the next political cycle.

But the path to this outcome looks more turbulent, more credit-driven, and politically less stable than the standard "buy the dip" script assumes.

Macro View

For most of this cycle, holding a "bearish but constructive" stance has been rational:

Inflation, though high, is decelerating.

Policies are broadly supportive.

Risk asset valuations are high, but pullbacks have typically been met with liquidity injections.

Today, several factors have changed:

Government Shutdown: We experienced a prolonged government shutdown, which disrupted the release and quality of key macroeconomic data.

Statistical Uncertainty: Senior officials themselves have acknowledged damage to the federal statistical system, meaning they lack confidence in the statistical series that underpin asset allocations worth trillions of dollars.

From Softness to Hawkishness: In this context, the Federal Reserve chose to pivot towards a more hawkish stance on both rate expectations and its balance sheet. Despite deteriorating leading indicators, they are still tightening financial conditions.

In other words, the system is exacerbating uncertainty and pressure rather than alleviating it. This represents a fundamentally different risk posture.

Policy Tightening in the Fog

The core issue lies not only in policy tightening but in where and how policy is tightening:

Data Fog: Key data releases (inflation, employment) have been delayed, distorted, or called into question post-shutdown. The Fed's "dashboard" has become unreliable at the most critical moment.

Rate Expectations: Despite forward-looking indicators pointing to deflation early next year, the market-implied probability of a near-term rate cut has been reined in as Fed officials make hawkish statements.

Even if the policy rate remains unchanged, the balance sheet's stance on quantitative tightening and the inclination to push more duration assets into the private sector are inherently hawkish for financial conditions.

Historically, the Fed's mistakes have often been mistimed: tightening too late, easing too late as well.

We face the risk of repeating this pattern: tightening in the face of slowing growth and data opacity rather than preemptively easing to address these conditions.

AI and Big Tech Entangled in a Story of "Leveraged Growth"

The second structural shift is in the nature of Big Tech and AI frontrunners:

Over the past decade, the "Mag7" have essentially functioned like equity bonds: holding dominant franchises, massive free cash flows, significant stock buybacks, and limited net leverage.

In the last 2-3 years, more and more of these free cash flows have been redirected towards AI capital expenditures: data centers, chips, infrastructure.

We are now entering a new phase where AI's incremental capital expenditure is increasingly financed through debt issuance rather than solely relying on internally generated cash.

This means:

Credit spreads and CDS (Credit Default Swaps) are starting to move. As leverage increases for AI infrastructure financing, the credit spreads of companies like Oracle are widening.

Stock market volatility is no longer the only risk. We are now seeing sectors that once felt "bulletproof" entering into a classic credit cycle dynamic.

Market structure has amplified this. These names have become overly represented in major indices; their transition from "cash cows" to "leveraged growth" has changed the risk profile of the entire index.

This does not automatically mean an AI "bubble" burst. If the returns are genuine and sustainable, leveraging for capital expenditure is also reasonable.

However, it does mean that margin for error has become smaller, especially in a higher interest rate, tighter policy environment.

Signs of a Credit Disconnect with the Private Market

Beneath the surface of public markets, private credit is showing early signs of stress:

The same loan is being substantially differently valued by different managers (e.g., one values it at around 70 cents on the dollar, another at around 90 cents).

This divergence is a typical precursor to a broader debate between model-based valuation and market-based valuation.

This pattern echoes:

2007 - Rise in distressed assets, widening spreads, while stock indices remained relatively calm.

2008 - Markets considered cash equivalents (e.g., auction rate securities) suddenly freezing.

Additionally:

The Fed's excess reserves are starting to decline from their peak.

The Fed is increasingly realizing that some form of balance sheet re-expansion may be needed to prevent financial plumbing problems.

None of this guarantees a crisis will occur. But it aligns with a credit quietly tightening system, still framed as "data-dependent" rather than preemptive.

The Repurchase Agreement (REPO) market was the first place where the "not quite abundant" story began to show

In this radar chart, "Repo transaction volume reaching or exceeding the IORB share" is the clearest indicator that we are quietly moving away from a truly ample reserve system.

In the third quarter of 2018 and early 2019, this metric was relatively contained: Ample reserves meant that the majority of repo financing transactions comfortably traded below the IORB lower bound.

By September 2019, just before the repo crisis erupted, this line had sharply widened, with an increasing number of repo transactions trading at or above the IORB—a typical symptom of collateral and reserve scarcity.

Now, consider June 2025 versus October 2025:

The light blue line (June) still securely sits within the bounds, but the red line for October 2025 extends outward, approaching the 2019 shape, indicating more repo transactions are touching the policy floor.

In other words, as reserves are no longer ample, dealers and banks are pushing up overnight funding rates.

Combined with other indicators (more intraday overdrafts, higher discount window usage, and an increase in failed payments), you get a clear signal.

The K-Shaped Economy Evolving Into a Political Variable

What we have long referred to as the "K-shaped" economic divergence, I now see has become a political variable:

Household income expectations are diverging. Long-term financial outlooks (such as 5-year expectations) are showing a staggering gap: some groups expect stability or improvement, while others anticipate sharp deterioration.

Real-world stress indicators are flashing:

Default rates are rising among subprime borrowers.

Homeownership is being delayed, with the median age of first-time buyers nearing retirement age.

Youth unemployment rates in multiple markets are gradually rising.

For a growing segment of the population, the system is not just "unequal"; it's broken:

They have no assets, limited wage growth, and virtually no viable path to participate in asset inflation.

The implicit social contract of "work hard, get ahead, build wealth and security" is crumbling.

In this environment, political behavior will shift:

Voters are no longer selecting the "best caretakers" of the current system.

They are increasingly willing to support left-wing or right-wing disruptive or extreme candidates because, for them, the downside is limited: "It can't get any worse than this anyway."

Future policies regarding taxation, redistribution, regulation, and monetary support will be formulated in this context. This is not neutral for the market.

High Market Concentration as a Systemic and Political Risk

Market value is highly concentrated in the hands of a few companies. However, what is less discussed is its systemic and political impact:

The top 10 companies now represent about 40% of the major U.S. stock indexes.

These companies:

- Are core holdings of pension funds, 401(k)s, and retail investment portfolios.

- Are increasingly leveraged to AI, exposed to the Chinese market, and sensitive to the interest rate path.

- Effectively hold a monopoly position in multiple digital domains.

This creates three intertwined risks:

1. Systemic market risk. Shocks to these companies—whether from earnings, regulation, or geopolitics (such as Taiwan, China demand)—would quickly transmit to the entire household wealth complex.

2. National security risk. When so much national wealth and productivity are concentrated in a few externally dependent companies, they become a strategic weakness.

3. Political risk. In a K-shaped, populist environment, these companies are the most visible targets of resentment: higher taxes, windfall profit taxes, buyback restrictions. They will face antitrust-driven breakups and strict AI and data regulation.

In other words, these companies are not just growth engines; they are also potential policy targets, and the probability of them becoming targets is increasing.

Bitcoin, Gold, and the Failure (Temporary) of the "Perfect Hedge" Narrative

In a world full of policy error risk, credit pressure, and political instability, one might have expected Bitcoin to thrive as a macro hedge. However, gold has behaved more like a traditional crisis hedge: steadily strengthening, low volatility, increasing correlation in portfolios.

Bitcoin's trading performance resembles more of a high Beta risk asset:

- Highly correlated with liquidity cycles.

- Sensitive to leverage and structured products.

- Old-guard long-term holders (OG) are selling in this environment.

The original decentralized/currency revolution narrative remains conceptually compelling, but in practice:

- Today's dominant fund flows are financialized: yield strategies, derivatives, and short-volatility behavior.

- Bitcoin's empirical behavior is closer to a Tech Stock Beta than a neutral, robust hedging tool.

- I still see a plausible path where 2026 becomes a significant inflection point for Bitcoin (next policy cycle, the next wave of stimulus, and further erosion of trust in traditional assets).

But investors should recognize that, at this stage, Bitcoin does not provide many with the hoped-for hedging properties; it is part of the same liquidity complex that concerns us.

Scenario Framework Towards 2026

A useful framework for understanding the current environment is: this is a managed bubble deleveraging designed to create space for the next round of stimulus.

The sequence might be as follows:

2024 to mid-2025: Managed tightening and pressure.

- Periodic drags from government shutdowns and political dysfunction.

- The Fed tilts hawkish in rhetoric and on the balance sheet, tightening financial conditions.

- Credit spreads modestly widen; speculative sectors (AI, long-duration tech stocks, certain private credits) absorb initial shocks.

End of 2025 to 2026: Reintegration into the political cycle.

- As inflation expectations fall and the market corrects, policymakers regain a ‘space’ for easing.

- We see rate cuts and fiscal measures calibrated to support growth and election goals.

- Given the lag, inflation consequences will come into view post significant political milestones.

Post-2026: Systemic repricing.

- Depending on the scale and form of the next round of stimulus, we face a new cycle of asset inflation with higher political and regulatory interventions, or more abruptly confront issues of debt sustainability, concentration, and social contracts.

This framework is not deterministic, but it aligns with current incentives:

- Politicians prioritize re-election over long-term equilibrium.

- The simplest toolbox remains liquidity and transfer payments rather than structural reforms.

- to employ this toolbox again, they first need to squeeze out some of today's froth.

Conclusion

All signals point to one conclusion: the system is entering a phase of increased fragility and lower tolerance for error.

In fact, historical patterns show that policymakers will ultimately respond with a heavy dose of liquidity.

But moving into the next stage requires first going through:

- Tighter Financial Conditions

- Increasing Credit Sensitivity

- Political Turbulence

- Growingly Non-linear Policy Response

Original Article Link

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China's Central Bank and Eight Other Departments' Latest Regulatory Focus: Key Attention to RWA Tokenized Asset Risk


Foreword: Today, the People's Bank of China's website published the "Notice of the People's Bank of China, National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, Ministry of Public Security, State Administration for Market Regulation, China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission, China Securities Regulatory Commission, State Administration of Foreign Exchange on Further Preventing and Dealing with Risks Related to Virtual Currency and Others (Yinfa [2026] No. 42)", the latest regulatory requirements from the eight departments including the central bank, which are basically consistent with the regulatory requirements of recent years. The main focus of the regulation is on speculative activities such as virtual currency trading, exchanges, ICOs, overseas platform services, and this time, regulatory oversight of RWA has been added, explicitly prohibiting RWA tokenization, stablecoins (especially those pegged to the RMB). The following is the full text:


To the people's governments of all provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities directly under the Central Government, the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps:


  Recently, there have been speculative activities related to virtual currency and Real-World Assets (RWA) tokenization, disrupting the economic and financial order and jeopardizing the property security of the people. In order to further prevent and address the risks related to virtual currency and Real-World Assets tokenization, effectively safeguard national security and social stability, in accordance with the "Law of the People's Republic of China on the People's Bank of China," "Law of the People's Republic of China on Commercial Banks," "Securities Law of the People's Republic of China," "Law of the People's Republic of China on Securities Investment Funds," "Law of the People's Republic of China on Futures and Derivatives," "Cybersecurity Law of the People's Republic of China," "Regulations of the People's Republic of China on the Administration of Renminbi," "Regulations on Prevention and Disposal of Illegal Fundraising," "Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Foreign Exchange Administration," "Telecommunications Regulations of the People's Republic of China," and other provisions, after reaching consensus with the Cyberspace Administration of China, the Supreme People's Court, and the Supreme People's Procuratorate, and with the approval of the State Council, the relevant matters are notified as follows:


  I. Clarify the essential attributes of virtual currency, Real-World Assets tokenization, and related business activities


  (I) Virtual currency does not possess the legal status equivalent to fiat currency. Virtual currencies such as Bitcoin, Ether, Tether, etc., have the main characteristics of being issued by non-monetary authorities, using encryption technology and distributed ledger or similar technology, existing in digital form, etc. They do not have legal tender status, should not and cannot be circulated and used as currency in the market.


  The business activities related to virtual currency are classified as illegal financial activities. The exchange of fiat currency and virtual currency within the territory, exchange of virtual currencies, acting as a central counterparty in buying and selling virtual currencies, providing information intermediary and pricing services for virtual currency transactions, token issuance financing, and trading of virtual currency-related financial products, etc., fall under illegal financial activities, such as suspected illegal issuance of token vouchers, unauthorized public issuance of securities, illegal operation of securities and futures business, illegal fundraising, etc., are strictly prohibited across the board and resolutely banned in accordance with the law. Overseas entities and individuals are not allowed to provide virtual currency-related services to domestic entities in any form.


  A stablecoin pegged to a fiat currency indirectly fulfills some functions of the fiat currency in circulation. Without the consent of relevant authorities in accordance with the law and regulations, any domestic or foreign entity or individual is not allowed to issue a RMB-pegged stablecoin overseas.


(II)Tokenization of Real-World Assets refers to the use of encryption technology and distributed ledger or similar technologies to transform ownership rights, income rights, etc., of assets into tokens (tokens) or other interests or bond certificates with token (token) characteristics, and carry out issuance and trading activities.


  Engaging in the tokenization of real-world assets domestically, as well as providing related intermediary, information technology services, etc., which are suspected of illegal issuance of token vouchers, unauthorized public offering of securities, illegal operation of securities and futures business, illegal fundraising, and other illegal financial activities, shall be prohibited; except for relevant business activities carried out with the approval of the competent authorities in accordance with the law and regulations and relying on specific financial infrastructures. Overseas entities and individuals are not allowed to illegally provide services related to the tokenization of real-world assets to domestic entities in any form.


  II. Sound Work Mechanism


  (III) Inter-agency Coordination. The People's Bank of China, together with the National Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, the Ministry of Public Security, the State Administration for Market Regulation, the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission, the China Securities Regulatory Commission, the State Administration of Foreign Exchange, and other departments, will improve the work mechanism, strengthen coordination with the Cyberspace Administration of China, the Supreme People's Court, and the Supreme People's Procuratorate, coordinate efforts, and overall guide regions to carry out risk prevention and disposal of virtual currency-related illegal financial activities.


  The China Securities Regulatory Commission, together with the National Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, the Ministry of Public Security, the People's Bank of China, the State Administration for Market Regulation, the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission, the State Administration of Foreign Exchange, and other departments, will improve the work mechanism, strengthen coordination with the Cyberspace Administration of China, the Supreme People's Court, and the Supreme People's Procuratorate, coordinate efforts, and overall guide regions to carry out risk prevention and disposal of illegal financial activities related to the tokenization of real-world assets.


  (IV) Strengthening Local Implementation. The people's governments at the provincial level are overall responsible for the prevention and disposal of risks related to virtual currencies and the tokenization of real-world assets in their respective administrative regions. The specific leading department is the local financial regulatory department, with participation from branches and dispatched institutions of the State Council's financial regulatory department, telecommunications regulators, public security, market supervision, and other departments, in coordination with cyberspace departments, courts, and procuratorates, to improve the normalization of the work mechanism, effectively connect with the relevant work mechanisms of central departments, form a cooperative and coordinated working pattern between central and local governments, effectively prevent and properly handle risks related to virtual currencies and the tokenization of real-world assets, and maintain economic and financial order and social stability.


  III. Strengthened Risk Monitoring, Prevention, and Disposal


  (5) Enhanced Risk Monitoring. The People's Bank of China, China Securities Regulatory Commission, National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, Ministry of Public Security, State Administration of Foreign Exchange, Cyberspace Administration of China, and other departments continue to improve monitoring techniques and system support, enhance cross-departmental data analysis and sharing, establish sound information sharing and cross-validation mechanisms, promptly grasp the risk situation of activities related to virtual currency and real-world asset tokenization. Local governments at all levels give full play to the role of local monitoring and early warning mechanisms. Local financial regulatory authorities, together with branches and agencies of the State Council's financial regulatory authorities, as well as departments of cyberspace and public security, ensure effective connection between online monitoring, offline investigation, and fund tracking, efficiently and accurately identify activities related to virtual currency and real-world asset tokenization, promptly share risk information, improve early warning information dissemination, verification, and rapid response mechanisms.


  (6) Strengthened Oversight of Financial Institutions, Intermediaries, and Technology Service Providers. Financial institutions (including non-bank payment institutions) are prohibited from providing account opening, fund transfer, and clearing services for virtual currency-related business activities, issuing and selling financial products related to virtual currency, including virtual currency and related financial products in the scope of collateral, conducting insurance business related to virtual currency, or including virtual currency in the scope of insurance liability. Financial institutions (including non-bank payment institutions) are prohibited from providing custody, clearing, and settlement services for unauthorized real-world asset tokenization-related business and related financial products. Relevant intermediary institutions and information technology service providers are prohibited from providing intermediary, technical, or other services for unauthorized real-world asset tokenization-related businesses and related financial products.


  (7) Enhanced Management of Internet Information Content and Access. Internet enterprises are prohibited from providing online business venues, commercial displays, marketing, advertising, or paid traffic diversion services for virtual currency and real-world asset tokenization-related business activities. Upon discovering clues of illegal activities, they should promptly report to relevant departments and provide technical support and assistance for related investigations and inquiries. Based on the clues transferred by the financial regulatory authorities, the cyberspace administration, telecommunications authorities, and public security departments should promptly close and deal with websites, mobile applications (including mini-programs), and public accounts engaged in virtual currency and real-world asset tokenization-related business activities in accordance with the law.


  (8) Strengthened Entity Registration and Advertisement Management. Market supervision departments strengthen entity registration and management, and enterprise and individual business registrations must not contain terms such as "virtual currency," "virtual asset," "cryptocurrency," "crypto asset," "stablecoin," "real-world asset tokenization," or "RWA" in their names or business scopes. Market supervision departments, together with financial regulatory authorities, legally enhance the supervision of advertisements related to virtual currency and real-world asset tokenization, promptly investigating and handling relevant illegal advertisements.


  (IX) Continued Rectification of Virtual Currency Mining Activities. The National Development and Reform Commission, together with relevant departments, strictly controls virtual currency mining activities, continuously promotes the rectification of virtual currency mining activities. The people's governments of various provinces take overall responsibility for the rectification of "mining" within their respective administrative regions. In accordance with the requirements of the National Development and Reform Commission and other departments in the "Notice on the Rectification of Virtual Currency Mining Activities" (NDRC Energy-saving Building [2021] No. 1283) and the provisions of the "Guidance Catalog for Industrial Structure Adjustment (2024 Edition)," a comprehensive review, investigation, and closure of existing virtual currency mining projects are conducted, new mining projects are strictly prohibited, and mining machine production enterprises are strictly prohibited from providing mining machine sales and other services within the country.


  (X) Severe Crackdown on Related Illegal Financial Activities. Upon discovering clues to illegal financial activities related to virtual currency and the tokenization of real-world assets, local financial regulatory authorities, branches of the State Council's financial regulatory authorities, and other relevant departments promptly investigate, determine, and properly handle the issues in accordance with the law, and seriously hold the relevant entities and individuals legally responsible. Those suspected of crimes are transferred to the judicial authorities for processing according to the law.


 (XI) Severe Crackdown on Related Illegal and Criminal Activities. The Ministry of Public Security, the People's Bank of China, the State Administration for Market Regulation, the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission, the China Securities Regulatory Commission, as well as judicial and procuratorial organs, in accordance with their respective responsibilities, rigorously crack down on illegal and criminal activities related to virtual currency, the tokenization of real-world assets, such as fraud, money laundering, illegal business operations, pyramid schemes, illegal fundraising, and other illegal and criminal activities carried out under the guise of virtual currency, the tokenization of real-world assets, etc.


  (XII) Strengthen Industry Self-discipline. Relevant industry associations should enhance membership management and policy advocacy, based on their own responsibilities, advocate and urge member units to resist illegal financial activities related to virtual currency and the tokenization of real-world assets. Member units that violate regulatory policies and industry self-discipline rules are to be disciplined in accordance with relevant self-regulatory management regulations. By leveraging various industry infrastructure, conduct risk monitoring related to virtual currency, the tokenization of real-world assets, and promptly transfer issue clues to relevant departments.


  IV. Strict Supervision of Domestic Entities Engaging in Overseas Business Activities


(XIII) Without the approval of relevant departments in accordance with the law and regulations, domestic entities and foreign entities controlled by them may not issue virtual currency overseas.


  (XIV) Domestic entities engaging directly or indirectly in overseas external debt-based tokenization of real-world assets, or conducting asset securitization activities abroad based on domestic ownership rights, income rights, etc. (hereinafter referred to as domestic equity), should be strictly regulated in accordance with the principles of "same business, same risk, same rules." The National Development and Reform Commission, the China Securities Regulatory Commission, the State Administration of Foreign Exchange, and other relevant departments regulate it according to their respective responsibilities. For other forms of overseas real-world asset tokenization activities based on domestic equity by domestic entities, the China Securities Regulatory Commission, together with relevant departments, supervise according to their division of responsibilities. Without the consent and filing of relevant departments, no unit or individual may engage in the above-mentioned business.


  (15) Overseas subsidiaries and branches of domestic financial institutions providing Real World Asset Tokenization-related services overseas shall do so legally and prudently. They shall have professional personnel and systems in place to effectively mitigate business risks, strictly implement customer onboarding, suitability management, anti-money laundering requirements, and incorporate them into the domestic financial institutions' compliance and risk management system. Intermediaries and information technology service providers offering Real World Asset Tokenization services abroad based on domestic equity or conducting Real World Asset Tokenization business in the form of overseas debt for domestic entities directly or indirectly venturing abroad must strictly comply with relevant laws and regulations. They should establish and improve relevant compliance and internal control systems in accordance with relevant normative requirements, strengthen business and risk control, and report the business developments to the relevant regulatory authorities for approval or filing.


  V. Strengthen Organizational Implementation


  (16) Strengthen organizational leadership and overall coordination. All departments and regions should attach great importance to the prevention of risks related to virtual currencies and Real World Asset Tokenization, strengthen organizational leadership, clarify work responsibilities, form a long-term effective working mechanism with centralized coordination, local implementation, and shared responsibilities, maintain high pressure, dynamically monitor risks, effectively prevent and mitigate risks in an orderly and efficient manner, legally protect the property security of the people, and make every effort to maintain economic and financial order and social stability.


  (17) Widely carry out publicity and education. All departments, regions, and industry associations should make full use of various media and other communication channels to disseminate information through legal and policy interpretation, analysis of typical cases, and education on investment risks, etc. They should promote the illegality and harm of virtual currencies and Real World Asset Tokenization-related businesses and their manifestations, fully alert to potential risks and hidden dangers, and enhance public awareness and identification capabilities for risk prevention.


  VI. Legal Responsibility


  (18) Engaging in illegal financial activities related to virtual currencies and Real World Asset Tokenization in violation of this notice, as well as providing services for virtual currencies and Real World Asset Tokenization-related businesses, shall be punished in accordance with relevant regulations. If it constitutes a crime, criminal liability shall be pursued according to the law. For domestic entities and individuals who knowingly or should have known that overseas entities illegally provided virtual currency or Real World Asset Tokenization-related services to domestic entities and still assisted them, relevant responsibilities shall be pursued according to the law. If it constitutes a crime, criminal liability shall be pursued according to the law.


  (19) If any unit or individual invests in virtual currencies, Real World Asset Tokens, and related financial products against public order and good customs, the relevant civil legal actions shall be invalid, and any resulting losses shall be borne by them. If there are suspicions of disrupting financial order and jeopardizing financial security, the relevant departments shall deal with them according to the law.


  This notice shall enter into force upon the date of its issuance. The People's Bank of China and ten other departments' "Notice on Further Preventing and Dealing with the Risks of Virtual Currency Trading Speculation" (Yinfa [2021] No. 237) is hereby repealed.


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